1986: Nuclear Testing Dishonesty

To many, nuclear testing is a mysterious, arcane and seemingly unimportant subject. Yet, the Soviet testing moratorium is the most significant superpower arms control gesture to occur in at least the last decade. The Reagan Administration opposes this halt to all nuclear testing including underground tests. Above ground, under-sea, and outer-space tests have been prohibited by treaty since the 1960's. When asked to explain why the U.S. has failed to join the Soviets in the moratorium, Administration spokesmen have offered specious arguments concerning the need to test to insure the "safety and security" of our nuclear arsenal. In fact, this Administration's insistence on testing reveals a hidden agenda, including development of key nuclear components of the star wars system. Citizens should pressure elected representatives (and candidates) to reverse the Administration's intransigence and seize this crucial opportunity for progress in reversing the nuclear arms race.

Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev announced a five-month unilateral moratorium on all nuclear test in July 1985. The U.S. response was immediate and deceptive. In fact, on the day of the announcement, Whitehouse spokesman Larry Speakes had also suddenly announced that the U.S. was making an "unconditional" and "unilateral" offer to allow Soviets to come and observe a weapons test at the Nevada Test Site. Since the moratorium announcement was privately communicated to the Administration the preceding day, the U.S. invitation can only be viewed as an attempt to "scoop" the Soviets in a public relations ploy, by substituting a virtually meaningless gesture for the strong arms control implications of a total test ban.

It quickly became apparent that the Administration had no interest in testing Soviet motives by agreeing to the moratorium. Then National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane off-handedly reject the Soviet offer because (1) they had recently completed a series of tests for 1985 and would "break out of the moratorium on an accelerated [testing] schedule," (2) they had breached a 1958 moratorium, and (3) they had been cheating on other treaties and had refused to accept on-site inspection and verification of tests. Futher, the Administration claimed that the Soviets had an advantage in strategic forces and had no intention to stop testing until these "imbalances" were redressed.

The media soon picked up these themes, reiterating that the Soviet testing halt was merely propaganda. According to the New York Times, the offer "would ring hollow even if it had not come immediately after an energetic series of Soviet test explosions." ABC's "Nightline" program carried an interview with McFarlane in which interviewer Ted Kopple blandly conceded McFarlane's statement that the Soviet's had "accelerated the number of tests that they've had so that they wouldn't need to test for the next five months or so." The other major networks engaged in a similar chorus of dismissal.

By August 1985, even McFarlane himself had admitted that the alleged "flurry" of Soviet testing was exagerated. The Soviets had conducted only seven nuclear tests from Janruary 1985 through July 1985, the U.S. eleven in the same period. In fact the U.S. has a substantial "lead" in total nuclear tests since 1945 (see graphic). Concerning the three Soviet tests which occured just prior to the moratorium, only two had military significance while the third may have been part of a project to store natural gas. Two military tests in a month could hardly be considered an "orgy" of testing. Yet, the media reaction had insured that the public had a firmly rooted association of the Soviet moratorium with propaganda.

Administration spokesmen have continued to claim that the Soviet moratorium cannot be trusted because of experience with an early Soviet testing moratorium. Supposedly, the Soviets "broke out" of this 1958 moratorium in 1961 with a massive series of tests. To interpret Soviet actions 25 years ago as disingenuous in order to prove similar motives today requires a massive re-writing of history with a cruel excision of the truth.

In reality, President Eisenhower had announced that the U.S. no longer recognized the moratorium in late 1959. Since the French had conducted four tests prior to a Soviet test and the Soviets had predicated the moratorium on "no testing by Western Powers," they can hardly be seen as having violated its letter or spirit.

Verification has long been cited by the Administration as a key problem with any test ban agreement. It is often stated that the Soviets are incessant cheaters on arms control treaties. Again, we see the Administration freely distorting the public record. In fact, negociations in the mid-1970's for the Threshold Test Ban and Comprehensive Test Ban produced protocols that included on-site inspection and a system of independent seismic monitors that could easily detect even the smallest of nuclear explosions. Further, the Soviets have recently hosted independent U.S. scientists under the auspices of the Natural Resouces Defense Council to "monitor" Soviet test sites (see Newsweek, July 28, 1986). Verification, then, is only a red herring introduced to diffuse public support for a test ban.

Many of these early deceptions have evaporated since the Soviets have extended the moratorium several times; currently it is set to expire at the end of 1986. It is no longer possible to argue that "they have just completed the year's tests...." Meanwhile, the U.S. weapons testing program continues unabated, with many tests since the Soviet moratorium.

The United States and Soviet Union are bound by the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 to negociate promptly a Comprehensive Test Ban, which would end all testing. But weapons makers have proceded with vigorous development of new designs. Congressmen Edward J. Markey, Democrat of Massachusettes, recently wrote to Casper Weinburger, Sect. of Defense in order to determine Pentagon policy concerning weapons design and our treaty committments to negociate a Comprehensive Test Ban. The reply came from current Administration point man on the testing issue, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. Gaffney's statement emphasized the need for nuclear testing in order to insure the "reliability" of the nuclear stockpile. Gaffney's basic argument is that the "military characteristics" of the weapons require periodic "proof tests." Components age and new weapons design variations supposedly introduce uncertainties that reduce the "security" of the weapons. In effect, the weapons designers are operating on the assumption that nuclear testing of their designs will always be possible.

Subsequent exchanges with Administration spokemen have produced similar arguments. In May, Undersect. of Defense Richard Perle appeared with Congressman Thomas Downey, (D-N.Y.) on the McNeil - Lerher Newshour. In a hilariously ironic statement, Perle claimed that testing made nuclear weapons "safe and secure." (How is a nuclear bomb "safe?") Perle refused to deal with Downey's substantive points concerning U.S. scuttling of the Comprehensive Test Ban and recently announced Soviet willingness to submit to any on-site inspections. In fact, Perle was speechless when Downey pointed out that "verification" no longer seemed to be discussed by the Administration as an objection to the test ban, and that the "safe and secure" argument was entirely a new reason for testing. Futhermore, Conressman Markey's research revealed that, "We rely on non-nuclear testing to provide most of our information on the performance of our warheads. Proof tests are very, very rare...." What, then, are the real reasons for the vigorous U.S. nuclear testing program?

U.S. weaponsmakers' demands for weapons testing can be explained as an imperitive of the technological expansion of the nuclear arms race. New designs for insane new targeting strategies and key nuclear components of the star wars system all require extensive nuclear testing. Administration planning for nuclear warfighting requires these technological developments. The Administration rejects any moratorium that would impede warfighting capabilies of weapons such as the MX missile, Trident II submarine, cruise missiles, etc. Such planning, for WWIII and beyond, is thus the driving force behind nuclear testing.

According to Paul Robinson, priciple associate director for national security programs at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in testimony before Congress, changes in Soviet weapons demand a new round of nuclear weapons: "Targets have increased in hardness, more mobile targets, a few deeply buried targets, a great emphasis on defense and defended targets, some hidden targets..."

Robinson sites "innovations" such as: "maneurverable re-entry vehicles to counter deployed Soviet strategic defenses; earth-penetrating weapons,...etc." A hot topic at the weapons labs is "Strategic Relocatatable Targets- Advanced Nuclear Effects," a program to generate microwave radiation by nuclear explosions in order to destroy mobile Soviet targets.

The x-ray laser, an integral part of envisioned star wars systems (see MPAC Newsletter, V11, #1&2, Dec. 1985, p. 17) would be powered by the explosion of an advanced nuclear warhead. Shrouded in secrecy, the x-ray laser has already undergone a controversial series of tests. Critics of the program have charged that weapons scientists hid bad results of a March 1985 test to make it look like the laser actually worked, thus justifying a $60 million budget request. (see Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jan. 1986, p. 2)

Beyond the issues of weapons lab secrecy and corruption, the x-ray laser poses very serious threats to world peace. Since it would require testing in outer-space, the U.S. would have to abrogate the treaty prohibiting outer-space nuclear explosions. The Soviets would certainly see such developments very threatenning, pushing the world closer to nuclear confrontation.

New weapons, then, not the reliability of old ones, is clearly the Reagan Administration's purpose in nuclear testing. The great desirability in a Comprehensive Test Ban is that it would essentially make advanced weapons development and the nuclear warfighting fantasies that go along with them impossible.

Given the collapse of the Iceland Summit over Reagan's intransigence about advanced weapons and star wars, it is now imperitive that the peace movement presses Congress hard for the Test Ban. In spite of the failure, the Administration has now shown a surprising ability to engage with the Soviets and talk about important issues. The American people must now push the Administration's hidden warfighting agenda off the table, and force the U.S. to join the Soviets in the testing moratorium. Then the President's noble Iceland goal of "eliminating" nuclear weapons in ten years would have real meaning, unclouded by the will of weapons makers.

Deep Blade Archive Cutting through the machinations and effects of the U.S. empire

	MPAC Newsletter (November 1986) RETURN HOME Deep Blade Journal (current postings) Deep Blade Journal Blog (8/21/2003–5/21/2004) Issue #1 02/11/2003, revised 03/12/2003 Why this war is wrong Powell’s credibility collapse Issue #2 03/12/2003 Why war? The role of oil Aftermath? I Issue #3 08/21/2003 Aftermath II U.S. Bases in Iraq? Archive of 2003 War Resources Alexander Cockburn’s war diary for March 29/30, 2003. U.S.-Iraq Chronology mostly covering the period 1980-1991 Going to War by Doug Allen 02/10/2003 A Failure of Skepticism in Powell Coverage Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) 02/10/2003 Why People Must Stop Bush's "Preemptive" War of Aggression by Carl Messineo and Mara Verheyden-Hilliard 09/29/2002 You Wanted to Believe Him: Colin Powell Does Sam Beckett by Robert Fisk 02/06/2003 UMaine and War Profiteering Op-Ed Bangor Daily News November 8, 2003 Archive of 1991 Gulf War Articles 1. Essay on the first Persian Gulf war, February 1991 2. Story from the Bangor Daily News March 9–10, 1991 by Tom Weber and Steve Kloehn concerning troops returning from the Persian Gulf War 3. The Persian Gulf War as Myth by Doug Allen, April 1991 911 Archive Why? Examining the Roots of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack on the United States They can't see why they are hated: Americans cannot ignore what their government does abroad	Nuclear Testing Dishonesty To many, nuclear testing is a mysterious, arcane and seemingly unimportant subject. Yet, the Soviet testing moratorium is the most significant superpower arms control gesture to occur in at least the last decade. The Reagan Administration opposes this halt to all nuclear testing including underground tests. Above ground, under-sea, and outer-space tests have been prohibited by treaty since the 1960's. When asked to explain why the U.S. has failed to join the Soviets in the moratorium, Administration spokesmen have offered specious arguments concerning the need to test to insure the "safety and security" of our nuclear arsenal. In fact, this Administration's insistence on testing reveals a hidden agenda, including development of key nuclear components of the star wars system. Citizens should pressure elected representatives (and candidates) to reverse the Administration's intransigence and seize this crucial opportunity for progress in reversing the nuclear arms race. Deception Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev announced a five-month unilateral moratorium on all nuclear test in July 1985. The U.S. response was immediate and deceptive. In fact, on the day of the announcement, Whitehouse spokesman Larry Speakes had also suddenly announced that the U.S. was making an "unconditional" and "unilateral" offer to allow Soviets to come and observe a weapons test at the Nevada Test Site. Since the moratorium announcement was privately communicated to the Administration the preceding day, the U.S. invitation can only be viewed as an attempt to "scoop" the Soviets in a public relations ploy, by substituting a virtually meaningless gesture for the strong arms control implications of a total test ban. It quickly became apparent that the Administration had no interest in testing Soviet motives by agreeing to the moratorium. Then National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane off-handedly reject the Soviet offer because (1) they had recently completed a series of tests for 1985 and would "break out of the moratorium on an accelerated [testing] schedule," (2) they had breached a 1958 moratorium, and (3) they had been cheating on other treaties and had refused to accept on-site inspection and verification of tests. Futher, the Administration claimed that the Soviets had an advantage in strategic forces and had no intention to stop testing until these "imbalances" were redressed. The media soon picked up these themes, reiterating that the Soviet testing halt was merely propaganda. According to the New York Times, the offer "would ring hollow even if it had not come immediately after an energetic series of Soviet test explosions." ABC's "Nightline" program carried an interview with McFarlane in which interviewer Ted Kopple blandly conceded McFarlane's statement that the Soviet's had "accelerated the number of tests that they've had so that they wouldn't need to test for the next five months or so." The other major networks engaged in a similar chorus of dismissal. By August 1985, even McFarlane himself had admitted that the alleged "flurry" of Soviet testing was exagerated. The Soviets had conducted only seven nuclear tests from Janruary 1985 through July 1985, the U.S. eleven in the same period. In fact the U.S. has a substantial "lead" in total nuclear tests since 1945 (see graphic). Concerning the three Soviet tests which occured just prior to the moratorium, only two had military significance while the third may have been part of a project to store natural gas. Two military tests in a month could hardly be considered an "orgy" of testing. Yet, the media reaction had insured that the public had a firmly rooted association of the Soviet moratorium with propaganda. Administration spokesmen have continued to claim that the Soviet moratorium cannot be trusted because of experience with an early Soviet testing moratorium. Supposedly, the Soviets "broke out" of this 1958 moratorium in 1961 with a massive series of tests. To interpret Soviet actions 25 years ago as disingenuous in order to prove similar motives today requires a massive re-writing of history with a cruel excision of the truth. In reality, President Eisenhower had announced that the U.S. no longer recognized the moratorium in late 1959. Since the French had conducted four tests prior to a Soviet test and the Soviets had predicated the moratorium on "no testing by Western Powers," they can hardly be seen as having violated its letter or spirit. Verification has long been cited by the Administration as a key problem with any test ban agreement. It is often stated that the Soviets are incessant cheaters on arms control treaties. Again, we see the Administration freely distorting the public record. In fact, negociations in the mid-1970's for the Threshold Test Ban and Comprehensive Test Ban produced protocols that included on-site inspection and a system of independent seismic monitors that could easily detect even the smallest of nuclear explosions. Further, the Soviets have recently hosted independent U.S. scientists under the auspices of the Natural Resouces Defense Council to "monitor" Soviet test sites (see Newsweek, July 28, 1986). Verification, then, is only a red herring introduced to diffuse public support for a test ban. Many of these early deceptions have evaporated since the Soviets have extended the moratorium several times; currently it is set to expire at the end of 1986. It is no longer possible to argue that "they have just completed the year's tests...." Meanwhile, the U.S. weapons testing program continues unabated, with many tests since the Soviet moratorium. "Safe and Secure" Nuclear Weapons The United States and Soviet Union are bound by the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 to negociate promptly a Comprehensive Test Ban, which would end all testing. But weapons makers have proceded with vigorous development of new designs. Congressmen Edward J. Markey, Democrat of Massachusettes, recently wrote to Casper Weinburger, Sect. of Defense in order to determine Pentagon policy concerning weapons design and our treaty committments to negociate a Comprehensive Test Ban. The reply came from current Administration point man on the testing issue, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. Gaffney's statement emphasized the need for nuclear testing in order to insure the "reliability" of the nuclear stockpile. Gaffney's basic argument is that the "military characteristics" of the weapons require periodic "proof tests." Components age and new weapons design variations supposedly introduce uncertainties that reduce the "security" of the weapons. In effect, the weapons designers are operating on the assumption that nuclear testing of their designs will always be possible. Subsequent exchanges with Administration spokemen have produced similar arguments. In May, Undersect. of Defense Richard Perle appeared with Congressman Thomas Downey, (D-N.Y.) on the McNeil - Lerher Newshour. In a hilariously ironic statement, Perle claimed that testing made nuclear weapons "safe and secure." (How is a nuclear bomb "safe?") Perle refused to deal with Downey's substantive points concerning U.S. scuttling of the Comprehensive Test Ban and recently announced Soviet willingness to submit to any on-site inspections. In fact, Perle was speechless when Downey pointed out that "verification" no longer seemed to be discussed by the Administration as an objection to the test ban, and that the "safe and secure" argument was entirely a new reason for testing. Futhermore, Conressman Markey's research revealed that, "We rely on non-nuclear testing to provide most of our information on the performance of our warheads. Proof tests are very, very rare...." What, then, are the real reasons for the vigorous U.S. nuclear testing program? The Hidden Testing Agenda U.S. weaponsmakers' demands for weapons testing can be explained as an imperitive of the technological expansion of the nuclear arms race. New designs for insane new targeting strategies and key nuclear components of the star wars system all require extensive nuclear testing. Administration planning for nuclear warfighting requires these technological developments. The Administration rejects any moratorium that would impede warfighting capabilies of weapons such as the MX missile, Trident II submarine, cruise missiles, etc. Such planning, for WWIII and beyond, is thus the driving force behind nuclear testing. According to Paul Robinson, priciple associate director for national security programs at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in testimony before Congress, changes in Soviet weapons demand a new round of nuclear weapons: "Targets have increased in hardness, more mobile targets, a few deeply buried targets, a great emphasis on defense and defended targets, some hidden targets..." Robinson sites "innovations" such as: "maneurverable re-entry vehicles to counter deployed Soviet strategic defenses; earth-penetrating weapons,...etc." A hot topic at the weapons labs is "Strategic Relocatatable Targets- Advanced Nuclear Effects," a program to generate microwave radiation by nuclear explosions in order to destroy mobile Soviet targets. The x-ray laser, an integral part of envisioned star wars systems (see MPAC Newsletter, V11, #1&2, Dec. 1985, p. 17) would be powered by the explosion of an advanced nuclear warhead. Shrouded in secrecy, the x-ray laser has already undergone a controversial series of tests. Critics of the program have charged that weapons scientists hid bad results of a March 1985 test to make it look like the laser actually worked, thus justifying a $60 million budget request. (see Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jan. 1986, p. 2) Beyond the issues of weapons lab secrecy and corruption, the x-ray laser poses very serious threats to world peace. Since it would require testing in outer-space, the U.S. would have to abrogate the treaty prohibiting outer-space nuclear explosions. The Soviets would certainly see such developments very threatenning, pushing the world closer to nuclear confrontation. SUPPORT A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN New weapons, then, not the reliability of old ones, is clearly the Reagan Administration's purpose in nuclear testing. The great desirability in a Comprehensive Test Ban is that it would essentially make advanced weapons development and the nuclear warfighting fantasies that go along with them impossible. Given the collapse of the Iceland Summit over Reagan's intransigence about advanced weapons and star wars, it is now imperitive that the peace movement presses Congress hard for the Test Ban. In spite of the failure, the Administration has now shown a surprising ability to engage with the Soviets and talk about important issues. The American people must now push the Administration's hidden warfighting agenda off the table, and force the U.S. to join the Soviets in the testing moratorium. Then the President's noble Iceland goal of "eliminating" nuclear weapons in ten years would have real meaning, unclouded by the will of weapons makers.