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Myth as true story?
If the first sense of myth, as a
fictitious story, something that is factually and historically
false, gets to the bottom of much of the Persian Gulf war
story, why is it even necessary to consider the more
controversial second meaning? Certainly one can make sense of
most of what has occurred without recourse to something
analogous to the traditional nature, structure, and function of
religious myth. Without citing myth as believed “true
story,” most of the Persian Gulf mythic construction can
be understood in terms of dominant U.S. economic and political
interests. For example, those powerful interests require the
effective formulation and perpetuation of false stories in
order to deflect attention from domestic problems and
discontent; to facilitate access to and control over the
world’s most attractive sources of oil; to maintain
public support as the U.S. uses its military superiority
in pursuit of domination over the Third World; to counter
Japanese, Pacific Rim and Western European economic challenges;
to help Bush change his image and improve his ratings; and so
forth.
Similarly, one can analyze much of the
media’s role in war-as-myth in the first sense, not only
in terms of reporting highly censored and limited accounts, but
also as enthusiastic mindless cheerleader, itself creating and
perpetuating much of the mythic “news.’
Myths about support for and lack of support
for the troops
Psychological explanations also help us to understand the
mythic function of these widely believed untruths. For example,
during recent months, most citizens in the U.S. have been led
to believe that perhaps the major characteristic of the U.S.
antiwar movement was its mistreatment of returning troops from
Vietnam. On a daily basis, citizens have been rushing to the
Bangor airport, even at 2:00AM, to meet
returning unknown Persian Gulf troops, frequently citing this
as their first reason: collective guilt over the abusive
treatment (by others) of Vietnam troops and the desire to do
the right thing this time.
The truth: Far
fewer than 1% of the antiwar movement ever spit on or heaped
verbal abuse (or even observed others doing this) on returning
Vietnam troops. A far larger number of returning soldiers, who
had become critical of the war, were appreciated and honored
participants In the antiwar movement. But by far the largest
number of returning troops simply were ignored since they were
not a target of or a pressing concern on the antiwar agenda.
Yet the historical and factual record has had little effect on
the psychological and political use of this and other myths by
politicians and the media.
So why is it necessary even to consider
the traditional use of myth by those who believe and live
myths? Because after providing the necessary historical,
economic, political, military. psychological, and media
explanations, one has the feeling that she or he hasn’t
made sense of the whole story. Something else, something more
is also going on that perplexes, confuses, and frustrates some
of the antiwar movement.
Consider this local illustration: Probably more than any other place in the
Untied States, the Bangor area has been caught up in the war
euphoria. This has surprised me since my experience has been
that Maine citizens generally tend to be more cautious,
reserved, individualistic, tolerant, levelheaded, and skeptical
than those in many other parts of the country. The main
objective factor in this surprising reaction is the location of
the Bangor International Airport. Recently it was reported that
about 40% of returning Gulf troops deplane in Bangor on their
way home. In many ways, this has become a competitive event, a
way of outdoing the rest of the country and putting Bangor on
the map. Visitors from Chicago and other parts of the country
are amazed at the Bangor airport response. The Chamber of
Commerce and local business interests, politicians, churches
and schools, and the media (not only providing overwhelming
coverage but listing all incoming flights with troops and
encouraging citizens to get on the bandwagon) have been part of
the construction and perpetuation of the fictitious war myth.
But even that doesn’t fully account for the incredible
local reaction.
More is going on. Many reactions are so
excessive that they seem, at least partially, to elude any
rational explanation. Some Mainers say that they do not want to
miss “the experience,” that the airport event is
“the experience of a lifetime.” In certain
respects. there is for some participants an atmosphere
approaching a religious pilgrimage. There certainly is a
carnival-like atmosphere of intense emotional celebration. Many
regard the troops the way they might a Michael Jordan or a
Bruce Springsteen screeching, aggressively seeking hundreds of
prized autographs, asking/begging for medals, uniform buttons,
or other icons/mementos.
The “something more”
dimension is illustrated by observing that factual and
historical considerations usually seem totally irrelevant to
the above participants perhaps similar to the irrelevance of
such evidence to the mythic faith of certain religious people.
Some of the returning troops, when they deplane at Bangor, seem
initially confused and even embarrassed by the heroic
idealization of them and the falsification of their actual role
in the Gulf war.
Participants in local antiwar groups
provide a more accurate account of what occurred and then are
frustrated by the seeming irrelevance of what they are saying
for those caught up in the military victory euphoria. After
all, they point out that most of these returning troops sat
rather bored in the desert for four months (the most difficult
part of the whole experience according to most of them),
encountered no real danger, and then came home. For those who
did some fighting, what does it tell you when 2,000 sorties
flew on bombing missions over Iraq every day and usually not
even one plane is shot down? What does it tell you when US.
planes simply slaughter retreating, often unarmed, Iraqi troops
without any U.S. casualties? And yet few returning troops are
idealized into unprecedented heroic dimensions, regarded as if
they had suffered through the most life-threatening war
conditions of, say, WWII, Korea, or Vietnam and finally
overcome a strong opposing military force. Something else is
going on.
It is my interpretation that at least
some of this perplexing “else” is not fully mythic
in the strong sacred narrative sense, but it can be understood,
analogously, as fulfilling mythic functions, as part of a
reconstituted secular mythology. That is, without the clear
articulation of a sacred narrative and its prescribed
formalized ritual re-enactment, the Persian Gulf
“story” reveals various mythic features.
For many rushing to the Bangor
International Airport, for example, this is a self-transcending
experience, emotionally charged, a peak experience, opening
them up to something bigger than normal life. As with so much
religious experience, they state that their Persian Gulf
experience is overwhelming, “inexpressible,” that
you have to experience its reality yourself to know what it
means. They experience the returning troops not as fully human,
imperfect flesh-and blood individuals, but as romanticized,
idealized, attaining an exemplary status with little regard to
their actual historical existence. During these emotionally
charged encounters, the returning soldiers, if not deified,
sometimes attain a more-than-human status common for lower
spiritual figures in most mythology.
The mythic behavior at the airport (as
reflected, more generally, in the media) allows
participants/believers, at least temporarily, to make sense of
and endure their present existential crises: poverty,
unemployment, suffering, alienation, lack of meaningful
community, and so forth. Some structured meaningful order is at
least temporarily created out of their normal, chaotic,
fragmented existence. They are participating in something
value-affirming and ultimately significant in contrast to their
everyday existence. There is a spiritual, ethical, and communal
dimension to their participation. They wave flags, bring yellow
ribbons and flowers, and sing religious and political songs.
Some come close to worshipping’ the bigger-than-life
soldiers. For a few hours at the airport, many feel themselves
part of a meaningful community, even with very different people
from Maine that they have never before met.
Conclusions
I have tried to show that an
understanding of myth may shed light on U.S. reactions to the
war with Iraq. The first sense of myth, the creation and
perpetuation of untruths, helps us to get at most of the
economic, political, ideological, psychological, military, and
media dimensions of U.S. response to the Persian Gulf crisis.
It is important for us to expose the truths and realities
versus the myths.
It has also been my view that a second
sense of myth, analogous to that of religious narratives
believed as true stories, sheds light on some of the U.S.
response. The first sense of creating and popularizing
fictitious accounts and other untruths is related to the second
sense: Something analogous to the nature and function of
traditional religious stories is fueled by the historically and
factually false accounts. But countering the untruths does not
necessarily remove the believed myths or mythic behavior. I
have done little more than to suggest that in this second
traditional sense of myth, US. responses to the causes,
conduct, and aftermath of the war may not be fully mythic but
reveal mythic features,
In a longer article, this second, more
controversial interpretation could be developed by uncovering
deep political, economic, and cultural secular myths (often
having a religious aura) that have defined much of U.S.
history. Many of us, for example, grew up with a U.S. mythology
by watching hundreds of cowboys-and-Indians movies, U.S. war
movies, and other forms of socialization. We developed an
ideology, a shared belief system about the United States which
could never stand the test of historical, political, or
economic justification. We had shared stories that told us that
white people came to this country and settled and civilized it
for the most noble, moral, political, and religious reasons;
that “God is on our side”; that we are good and our
opponents evil; that the U.S. has “never lost a
war;” and so forth. Such myths gave us a sense of being
part of a meaningful united whole, justified our
country’s behavior at home and abroad, and were
re-enacted through flag waving, prayers, parades, patriotic
songs, and other rituals.
In many respects, the Vietnam War,
Watergate, more honest recognition of poverty, racism, sexism,
militarism, and imperialism, and other historical developments
helped to demythologize and debunk some of these mythic, sacred
beliefs. Part of the recent mythic behavior, of reacting to the
Persian Gulf war as myth, involves a process of
re-mythologization, of at least partially re-telling and
re-enacting some of those earlier mythic stories about the
United States, “our way of life” and the world.
Doug Allen
April 1991
April 1991
